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Abstract
Modern image classification systems are often built
on deep neural networks, which suffer from adversarial
examples—images with deliberately crafted, imperceptible
noise to mislead the network’s classification. To defend
against adversarial examples, a plausible idea is to obfus-
cate the network’s gradient with respect to the input image.
This general idea has inspired a long line of defense methods.
Yet, almost all of them have proven vulnerable.
We revisit this seemingly flawed idea from a radically
different perspective. We embrace the omnipresence of ad-
versarial examples and the numerical procedure of crafting
them, and turn this harmful attacking process into a useful
defense mechanism. Our defense method is conceptually
simple: before feeding an input image for classification,
transform it by finding an adversarial example on a pre-
trained external model. We evaluate our method against a
wide range of possible attacks. On both CIFAR-10 and Tiny
ImageNet datasets, our method is significantly more robust
than state-of-the-art methods. Particularly, in comparison to
adversarial training, our method offers lower training cost
as well as stronger robustness.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have vastly improved the perfor-
mance of image classification systems. Yet they are prone
to adversarial examples. Those are natural images with de-
liberately crafted, imperceptible noise, aiming to mislead
the network’s decision entirely [5, 41]. In numerous appli-
cations, from face recognition authorization to autonomous
cars [36, 43], the vulnerability caused by adversarial exam-
ples gives rise to serious security concerns and presses for
efficient defense mechanisms.
The defense, unfortunately, remains grim. Recent stud-
ies [34, 45, 12] suggest that the prevalence of adversarial
examples may be an inherent property of high-dimensional
natural data distributions. Facing this intrinsic difficulty of
eliminating adversarial examples, a plausible thought is to
conceal them—making them hard to find. Indeed, a long
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Figure 1. A simple and effective defense mechanism. Given an
input image, our defense method first transforms it through the pro-
cess of crafting adversarial examples on a pre-trained simple model
fb, deliberately adding strong adversarial noise. The transformed
image is then fed into another model fa for classification. The
same pipeline is applied in both training and inference.
line of works aims to obfuscate the network model’s gradient
with respect to its input [50, 14, 49, 7, 39, 33], motivated by
the fact that the gradient information is essential for crafting
adversarial examples: the gradient indicates how to perturb
the input to alter the network’s decision.
Yet, almost all these gradient obfuscation based defenses
have proven vulnerable. In their recent seminal work, Atha-
lye et al. [2] presented a suite of strategies for estimating
network gradients in the presence of gradient obfuscation.
Adversarial examples crafted by their method have success-
fully fooled many existing defense models, some of which
even yield 0% accuracy under their attack.
We revisit the idea of gradient obfuscation but take a
radically different approach. Instead of expelling adversarial
examples, we embrace them. Instead of obstructing the way
of finding adversarial examples on a model, we exploit it to
strengthen the robustness of another model.
Our defense is conceptually simple: before feeding an in-
put image to a classification model, we transform it through
the process of finding adversarial examples on an external
model. Mathematically, if we use f(x) to denote the model
that classifies an input image x, our defense model is ex-
pressed as f(g(x)), where g(·) represents the process of
finding an adversarial example near x on a pre-trained exter-
nal model (see Fig. 1).
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The robustness of our defense model f(g(x)) stems from
the fundamental difficulties of estimating the gradient of
g(x) with respect to x. Finding an adversarial example
amounts to searching for a local minimum on a highly fluctu-
ated objective landscape [26]. As a result, g(x) is not an ana-
lytic function, not smooth, not deterministic, but an iterative
procedure with random initialization and non-differentiable
operators. We show that all these traits together constitute a
highly robust defense mechanism.
We play devil’s advocate in attacking our defense model
thoroughly. We examine a wide range of possible attacks,
including those having successfully circumvented many pre-
vious defenses [2]. Under these attacks, we compare the
worst-case robustness of our method with state-of-the-art
defense methods on both CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet
datasets. Our defense demonstrates superior robustness over
those methods. Particularly, in comparison to models opti-
mized with adversarial training—by far the most effective
defense against white-box attacks—our method offers simul-
taneously lower training cost and stronger robustness.
2. Related Work
Adversarial attack. The seminal work of Biggio et al. [5]
and Szegedy et al. [41] first suggested the existence of ad-
versarial examples that can mislead deep neural networks.
The latter also used a constrained L-BFGS to find adversar-
ial examples. Goodfellow et al. [13] later introduced Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) that generates adversarial ex-
amples more efficiently. Madry et al. [26] further formalized
the problem of adversarial attacks and proposed Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) method, which further inspires
many subsequent attacking methods [11, 8, 28, 19]. PGD-
type methods are considered the strongest attacks based on
first-order information, namely the network’s gradient with
respect to the input [26]. To compute the gradients, the ad-
versary must have full access to the network structure and
parameters. This scenario is referred as the white-box attack.
When the adversary has no knowledge about the model,
the attack, referred as black-box attack, is not as easy as
the white-box attack. By far the most popular black-box
attack is the so-called transfer attack, which uses adversarial
examples generated on a known model (e.g., using PGD) to
attack an unknown model [30]. Several methods (e.g., [44,
3, 52, 16]) are proposed to improve the transferability of
the adversarial examples so that the adversarial examples
generated on one model are more likely to fool another
model. Another type of black-box attacking methods is
query-based [6, 37, 9, 1, 20]: they execute the model many
times with different input in order to learn the behavior of
the model and construct adversarial examples.
While our defense is motivated by attacks in white-box
scenarios, we evaluate our method under a wide range of pos-
sibilities, including both white-box and black-box attacks.
Adversarial defense. The threat of adversarial examples
has motivated active studies of defense mechanisms. By
far the most successful defense against white-box attacks is
adversarial training [26, 13, 38], and a rich set of methods
has been proposed to accelerate its training speed or further
improve its robustness [51, 54, 21, 13, 46, 35, 53, 29, 27]. In
comparison to adversarial training, our method offers both
stronger robustness and lower training cost.
To defend against gradient-based attacks (such as the
PGD attack), a natural idea is to obfuscate (or mask) network
gradients [30, 44]. To this end, there exist a long line of
works that apply random transformation to input images [50,
14], or employ stochastic activation functions [10] and non-
differentiable operators in the model [49, 7, 39, 33].
Unfortunately, many of these methods have proven vulner-
able by Athalye et al. [2], who introduced a set of attacking
strategies, including a method called Backward Pass Differ-
entiable Approximation (BPDA), to circumvent gradient ob-
fuscation (see further discussion in Sec. 3.1 and 3.3). Since
then, a few other gradient obfuscation based defenses have
been proposed [23, 31, 17, 42, 22]. But those works either
report degraded robustness under BPDA attacks [23, 31] or
neglected the evaluation against BPDA attacks [17, 42, 22].
Thus far, gradient obfuscation is generally considered
vulnerable (and at least incomplete) [2]. We revisit gradient
obfuscation, and our defense demonstrates unprecedented
robustness against BPDA and other possible attacks.
3. Defense via Adversarial Transformation
We now present a simple approach to defend against ad-
versarial attacks. We will first motivate and describe our
adversarial transformation (Sec. 3.1 and 3.2), and then pro-
vide the rationale of why it improves adversarial robustness
(Sec. 3.3 and 3.4), backed by empirical evidence (Sec. 4).
3.1. Motivation: Input Transformation
An attempt that has been explored in adversarial defense—
albeit unsuccessfully so far—is the defense via input transfor-
mation. Consider a neural network model fa that classifies
the input image x (i.e., evaluating fa(x)). Instead of feed-
ing x into fa directly, this defense approach transforms the
input image through an operator g before presenting it to the
classification model (i.e., evaluating fa(g(x))).
The transformation g is applied in both training and infer-
ence. Provided a training dataset X , the network weights θ
are optimized by solving
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E
(x,y)∈X
[`(fa(g(x);θ), y)] , (1)
where x and y are respectively the image and its correspond-
ing label drawn from the training dataset, and ` is the loss
function (such as cross entropy for classification tasks). Cor-
respondingly, at inference time, the model predicts the label
of an input image x by evaluating fa(g(x)).
Input transformation g(·) offers an opportunity to im-
plement the idea of gradient obfuscation. For example, by
transforming the input image with certain randomness such
as random resizing and padding [50], the network gradients
become hard to estimate.
Another use of g(·) for defense is to remove the noise
(or perturbations) in adversarial examples. For instance, g(·)
has been used to restore a natural image from a potentially
adversarial input, by projecting it on a GAN- or PixelCNN-
represented image manifold [33, 39] or regularizing the input
image through total variation minimization [14].
These input-transformation-based defense mechanisms
seem plausible. Yet they are all fragile. As demonstrated
by Athalye et al. [2], with random input transformation, ad-
versarial examples can still be found using Expectation over
Transformation [3], which estimates the network gradient
by taking the average over multiple trials (more details in
Sec. 3.3). The noise-removal transformation is also ineffec-
tive. One can use Backward Pass Differentiable Approxima-
tion [2] to easily construct effective adversarial examples. In
short, the current consensus is that input transformation as a
defense mechanism remains vulnerable.
We challenge this consensus. We now present a new input
transformation method for gradient obfuscation, followed by
the explanation of why it is able to avoid the shortcomings
of prior work and offer stronger adversarial robustness.
3.2. Adversarial Transformation
Our input transformation operation takes an approach op-
posite to the intuition behind previous methods [14, 39, 33].
In contrast to those aiming to purge input images of the adver-
sarial noise, we embrace adversarial noise. As we will show,
our transformation injects noticeably strong adversarial noise
into the input image. This seemingly counter-intuitive op-
eration is able to strengthen the network model in training,
making it more robust.
Our transformation operation relies on another network
model fb, whose choice will be discussed later in Sec. 3.4.
The model fb is pre-trained to perform the same task as fa.
Then, given an input image x, the transformation operator
g(·) is defined as the process that finds the adversarial exam-
ple nearby x to fool fb. Formally, this process is meant to
reach a local minimum of the optimization problem,
g(x) = arg min
x′∈∆x
`(fb(x
′), yL), (2)
where `(·) is the loss function as used in network training (1);
and yL is the adversarial target, setting to be the input x’s
least likely class predicted by fb. The adversarial examples
are restricted in ∆x, an L∞-ball at x, defined as ‖x′ −
x‖∞ < ∆. The perturbation range ∆ is a hyperparameter.
Transformation g(x) defined in (2) can be implemented
using any gradient-based attacking methods (such as Deep-
fool [28] and C&W [8]). We choose to use the least-likely
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. To launch a valid attack from an input image (a), the
adversarial example (b) must be perceptually similar to the original
image (e.g., here ∆ = 0.031). Otherwise, it can be easily pin-
pointed. In our method, the transformed image is used for training
fa, not attacking. We therefore intentionally add much stronger
adversarial noise to the input (c) (here ∆ = 0.2). The strong noise
helps to strengthen the robustness of fa and defend against BPDA
attacks (see Sec. 3.3).
class projected gradient descent (LL-PGD) method [19, 44].
LL-PGD is an iterative process, wherein each iteration up-
dates the adversarial example by the rule,
x′t = Πx′∈∆x
[
x′t−1 −  · sgn(∇x`(fb(x′t−1), yL))
]
. (3)
Here x′t denotes the adversarial example after t iterations;
sgn(·) is the sign function, and Πx′∈∆x [·] projects the image
back into the allowed perturbation ball ∆x. This iterative
process starts from a random perturbation of input image x,
namely x+ δ, where each element (pixel) in δ is uniformly
drawn from [−∆,∆]. The output x′N (after N iterations) is
the transformed version of x. In other words, g(x) = x′N ,
which we refer as adversarial transformation.
After defining the adversarial transformation g(·) based
on the pre-trained model fb, we use g(·) to train the model
fa as described in (1). At inference time, the label of an
image x is predicted as fa(g(x)). Figure 1 illustrates the
pipeline of our method.
Differences from adversarial training. With adversarial
transformation, our training process superficially resembles
the adversarial training, because both training processes need
to search for adversarial examples of the input training data.
But fundamental differences exist. In adversarial training, a
single model fa is used for crafting adversarial examples and
evolving itself at each epoch, whereas our method involves
two models: the model fb is pre-trained and stays fixed
during both the training of fa and the inference using fa.
The consequence of using a fixed external model fb for
adversarial transformation is substantial. As we will discuss
in Sec. 3.4, fb can be chosen much simpler than fa. As
a result, crafting the adversarial examples on fb has lower
cost than that on fa, and thus our training process is faster
than adversarial training (see experiments in Sec. 5). More
remarkably, the adversarial transformation using fb makes
the model fa much harder to attack, as explained next.
3.3. Rationale behind Adversarial Transformation
Embracing adversarial noise. Given an input image x,
our adversarial transformation effectively adds perturbation
noise to x. The perturbation range ∆ controls how much
noise is added. Normally, in adversarial attacks, ∆ is set
small to generate adversarial examples perceptually similar
to the input image. But when we use adversarial attacks (on
fb) as a means of input transformation for training fa, we
have the freedom to use a much larger ∆, thereby adding
noticeably stronger adversarial noise (see Fig. 2-c).
At training time, the excessively strong adversarial noise
forces the network fa to learn how to classify robustly. This
is because perturbations crafted on an external model can
approximate the adversarial examples of the model under
training (an insight inspired the prior work [44]). This reason,
although valid, can not explain how our method is able to
avoid the deficiencies of prior defense methods. There exist
deeper reasons:
Randomness. The adversarial noise added by our g(x) is
randomized, since the update rule (3) always starts from the
input image with a random perturbation (i.e., x + δ with
uniformly sampled δi ∼ [−∆,∆]). Randomization is not
new; prior defenses also employ randomized transformations
to the input. But they have been circumvented by Expecta-
tion Over Transformation (EOT) [2, 3]. EOT attack first
estimates the gradient of expected f(g(x)) with respect to x
using the relationship∇Eg˜∼T f(g˜(x)) = Eg˜∼T ∇f(g˜(x)),
where g˜(·) is a deterministic version of g(·) sampled from
the distribution of randomized transformations T . It then
uses the estimated gradients in PGD-type attacks to generate
adversarial examples. Thus, the feasibility of EOT hinges
on a reliable estimation of ∇f(g˜(x)). In our method, g˜(x)
corresponds to solving the optimization problem (2) starting
from a particular sample x+ δ.
In what follows, we examine a range of strategies that
have been successfully used to estimate ∇f(g˜(x)) in prior
defense methods (and thus break them), and show that our
method is robust against all those attacking strategies.
Automatic differentiation. By chain rule, the estimation
of ∇f(g˜(x)) requires the knowledge of g˜(x)’s Jacobian
(first-order derivatives) Dg˜(x). A straightforward attempt
to this end is by unrolling the iterative steps (3) and using
automatic differentiation (AD) [47] to compute Dg˜(x). Yet,
this is infeasible. As shown in (3), the iterative steps involves
non-differentiable operators including sgn(·) and Πx′∈∆x [·].
Thus, directly applying AD leads to erroneous estimation of
Dg˜(x), which in turn obstructs the search for adversarial ex-
amples. Our early experiments indeed show that virtually no
adversarial examples crafted using AD can fool our model.
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA).
To circumvent the defense using non-differentiable opera-
tors, Athalye et al. [2] introduced a strategy called Back-
ward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) to esti-
mate the defense model’s gradients. The idea is to replace
the non-differentiable operators in g˜ with differentiable ap-
proximations, and estimate the derivatives Dg˜(x) in AD by
Figure 3. (left) We show a 1D depiction of our input transforma-
tion g(x), the process aiming to find the local minimum of the
optimization problem (2). Starting from an x0 at the red dot, g(x)
will reach a position at the red star. Perturbing x0 toward one side
(to the red square), g(x) will still reach the red star, and in this way,
the finite difference gradient vanishes. But if x0 is perturbed to
the green square, g(x) will reach the green star—an entirely dif-
ferent local minimum, and the finite difference gradient explodes.
(right) We plot ∂g˜i(x)
∂xj
(for particular i and j here) estimated by
finite difference method (4) with an increasing hj . When hj is
extremely small (< 10−5), the estimated gradient vanishes; as hj
increases, the estimated gradient fluctuates severely, due to the
reason illustrated on the left.
computing the AD’s forward pass using the original g˜ and
computing its backward pass using g˜’s differentiable approx-
imation. BPDA has succeed in gradient-based attacks (such
as PGD and C&W [8]) toward many prior defenses, allowing
the adversary to craft efficient adversarial examples.
When applying BPDA to estimate the gradients of our
defense model, we replace sgn(·) and Πx′∈∆x [·] in (3) with
their differentiable approximations (see Sec. 4.1 for details).
We found that if the number of iterations (LL-PGD steps)
for applying (3) is low (i.e., ≤ 2), BPDA indeed enables the
adversary to find valid adversarial examples. But when the
number of iterations is set moderately high (i.e.,> 4), BPDA
is greatly thwarted; the adversary can hardly find any valid
adversarial example (see Sec. 4.1). This is because the dif-
ferentiable approximations must be applied in each iteration,
and as the number of iterations increases, the approximation
error accumulates rapidly.
Finite difference gradients. Another strategy for estimat-
ing Dg˜(x) is the classic finite difference estimation. Each
element in the Jacobian matrix Dg˜(x) can be estimated using
∂g˜i(x)
∂xj
≈ 1
2h
[g˜i(x+ hj)− g˜i(x− hj)] , (4)
where g˜i(x) indicates the i-th element (or pixel) of the trans-
formed image, and hj is a vector with all zeros except the
j-th element (or pixel) which has a value h.
Our defense inherently thwarts this attacking strategy.
It causes the adversary to suffer from either exploding or
vanishing gradients [2]. Figure 3-left shows a 1D depic-
tion illustrating this phenomenon in our method. Indeed,
our experiments confirm that it is too unreliable to estimate
derivatives using (4) (see Fig. 3-right).
Reparameterization. Vanishing and exploding gradients
have been exploited as a defense mechanism [39, 33]. Yet
those defenses have been proven vulnerable under a reparam-
eterization strategy [2]. This strategy aims to find some dif-
ferentiable function h(·) for a change-of-variable x = h(z)
such that g˜(h(z)) ≈ h(z). If such a function h(·) can be
found, then one can compute the gradient of the differen-
tiable function f(h(z)) to launch adversarial attack.
To break our defense using this strategy, one must find an
h(·) that constructs the adversarial examples of fb directly
(so that g˜(h(·)) = h(·)), without solving the optimization
problem (2). We argue that finding such an h(·) is extremely
hard. If h(·) could be constructed, we would have a direct
way of crafting adversarial examples; PGD-type iterations
would not be needed; and the entire territory of adversarial
learning would be redefined—which are unlikely to happen.
Indeed, we implemented this strategy by training a neural
network model hθ that aims to minimize ‖hθ(x)− g˜(x)‖2
over the natural image distribution. This attempt is futile.
Our experiments show that the generalization error of the
trained hθ is too high to launch any valid adversarial attack
(see Appendix A.2). This conclusion also echos the prior
studies [4, 48], which show that learning-based adversarial
attacks usually perform worse than gradient-based attacks.
Identity mapping approximation. Some prior defense
methods also use an optimization process to transform the
input image—for example, the optimization that aims to
erase adversarial noise from the input image [14, 33]. In
those defenses, the transformed image g(x) remain similar
to the input x. Consequently, as shown in [2], those defenses
can be easily circumvented by replacing g(·) with the identity
mapping in the backward pass of BPDA attack.
Similarly, in our defense, if the perturbation range ∆
in (3) for defining g(·) were set small, g(x) (the adversarial
example of fb) would be close to x, and our defense would
be at risk. To prevent this vulnerability, we must ensure that
g(·) be far from the identity mapping. This requires us to set
a relatively large ∆. In practice, we use ∆ = 0.2 for pixel
values ranging in [0, 1] (see details in Sec. 4.1).
It turns out that a relatively large ∆ is necessary but not
sufficient. The choice of the network model fb also affects
how far g(x) is from x statistically, as we will discuss next.
3.4. Choosing Pre-trained Model fb
A large perturbation range ∆ allows our adversarial trans-
formation g(·) to output an image far from the input. Yet,
because of the randomness in g(·), a large ∆x can not guar-
antee that g(x) is statistically different from x. If the expec-
tation over the transformation Eg˜∼T g˜(x) remains close to
x, our defense method may still suffer from the aforemen-
tioned BPDA attack, in which identity mapping can be used
to approximate g(·) in the backward pass.
This intuition is supported by an empirical discovery. We
experimented with an input transformation g(·) constructed
using an untrained model f¯b whose weights are assigned
Expected
Adv. Image
Input Image 0 epoch
 = 0.006
1 epoch
 = 0.034
5 epochs
 = 0.048
15 epochs
 = 0.137
20 epochs
 = 0.141
Adv. trained
 = 0.263
Figure 4. We apply the adversarial transformation g(·) defined on
different models fb to an input image (top-left). Corresponding to
the six images toward the right are the fb models (with the same
network structure) untrained, trained with an increasing number of
epochs, and adversarially trained. In each of those six images, we
visualize the normalized difference between the input x and the ex-
pectation over transformation (EOT) image Eg˜∼T g˜(x) (estimated
using 5000 samples). The L∞ norms of the difference images are
shown under the images. Image in the red box (bottom-left) is the
EOT image Eg˜∼T g˜(x) produced using an adversarially trained fb
model. Because we intentionally use a large perturbation range
∆ = 0.2, this image has pronounced artifacts.
randomly. As shown in Fig. 4 and the first column in Table 1,
the expectation over transformation Eg˜∼T g˜(x) is indeed
close to x (in L∞ norm), and the BPDA attack with identity
mapping approximation can easily fool this defense model.
Next, we train a series of models f (i)b , each obtained with
an increasing number of training epochs. We found that
as the number of training epochs increases, the expectation
over transformation Eg˜∼T g˜(x) resulted by using each of
these f (i)b models drifts further away from x, that is, ‖x−
Eg˜∼T g˜(x)‖∞ increases. Meanwhile, the defense model
f(g(·)) trained with the corresponding f (i)b becomes more
robust, yielding increasingly better robust accuracy under
the BPDA attack (see Table 1).
Remarkably, we discover that an even larger distance
‖x − Eg˜∼T g˜(x)‖∞ can be obtained, if the model fb is
adversarially trained. When used in g(·), the adversarially
trained model fb further improves the robustness of our
defense model. This discovery confirms our intuition.
Computational performance. The choice of fb also af-
fects the computational cost of our defense method. A com-
plex network structure of fb makes g(·) expensive, which in
turn imposes a large performance overhead on both the train-
ing of fa and the inference using fa. Therefore, a simple
network structure is preferred.
The freedom of choosing a simple network fb brings our
method a performance advantage over adversarial training.
In adversarial training, adversarial examples are crafted on
the classification network fa for each input image at every
epoch. In our training, however, by choosing a model fb
Untrained 1 epoch 2 epochs 5 epochs 10 epochs 15 epochs 20 epochs Adv. trained
Standard Acc. 81.8% 81.6% 82.4% 83.0% 82.4% 82.2% 82.7% 82.9%
BPDA-I Acc. 30.6% 30.7% 40.0% 46.4% 62.3% 63.1% 62.9% 80.5%
Avg. L∞ dist. 0.005 0.033 0.036 0.067 0.130 0.133 0.136 0.272
Table 1. Discovery for choosing fb. Corresponding to individual columns are fb models untrained, trained with an increasing number
of epochs, and adversarially trained. For the defense model fa(g(·)) equipped with each fb, we evaluate its standard accuracy (first row)
and robust accuracy (second row) under the BPDA-I attack (see Sec. 4.1). The third row shows ‖x− Eg˜∼T g˜(x)‖∞ where Eg˜∼T g˜(x) is
estimated using 5000 samples. Notice the correlation between the increase of the L∞ distance and the increase of adversarial robustness.
simpler than fa, it becomes faster to find adversarial exam-
ples. As shown in our experiments (in Sec. 5), in comparison
to adversarial training, our defense requires shorter training
time, and at the same time offers stronger robustness.
Guiding rules. In summary, we present two guiding rules
for choosing fb. 1) fb should be chosen to yield a large
‖x− Eg˜∼T g˜(x)‖∞ value. Given an fb’s network structure,
adversarial training on fb (in pre-training step) is preferred.
2) Meanwhile, the structure of fb should be as simple as
possible. In Appendix A.1, we report fb’s network structure
that we use in our experiments.
4. Devil’s Advocate
We now play devil’s advocate in attacking our defense
method. In our defense, the network gradient with respect to
the input (i.e., ∇fa(g(x))) is intentionally undefined. Thus
one can not craft adversarial examples by directly applying
PGD-type methods on our defense (recall Sec. 2). We there-
fore evaluate our defense against a range of other possible
attacks, including those discussed in Sec. 3.3. Later in Sec. 5,
we will compare the worst-case robustness of our defense
under these attacks with various recently proposed defense
methods.
Common experiment setups. Experiments in this section
are conducted on CIFAR-10 dataset [18] with standard train-
ing/test split. We use ResNet18 [15] as the classification
model fa and a small VGG-style network for fb, whose de-
tails are given in Appendix A.1. All models are trained for 80
epochs using Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) (constant
learning rate=0.1, momentum=0.9). Our adversarial transfor-
mation g(·) performs LL-PGD update (3) for 13 iterations,
each with a stepsize  = ∆/6. The perturbation range ∆
varies in individual experiments, and will be reported therein.
Metric. Following prior work, our evaluation uses an accu-
racy measure defined as the ratio of the number of correctly
classified images to the total number of tested images. We
refer to this measure as standard accuracy if the tested im-
ages include only clean images, and as robust accuracy if
the tested images consist of adversarially crafted images.
4.1. BPDA Attack and the Variants
BPDA attack [2], as reviewed in Sec. 3.3, is a powerful
way to estimate network gradients that are obfuscated by
defense methods. The estimated gradients are then used in
Figure 5. Robustness under BPDA. We evaluate the robust accu-
racy of our defense under two versions of BPDA attacks, which
replace sgn(·) in (3) with soft sign (in orange) and tanh (in green),
respectively. The resulting two robust accuracies are compared
with our defense model’s standard accuracy (in blue) evaluated
with clean (natural) images. Along X-axis, we repeat this evalu-
ation, each time with an increasing number of LL-PGD steps (3)
in our adversarial transformation g(·). To highlight only the effect
of the smooth approximations of sgn(·) and Πx′∈∆x(·), we factor
out the randomness in our defense by disabling the random start
at the beginning of (3). After the network gradient is estimated
using BPDA, we use PGD to search for adversarial examples with
a maximum perturbation size of 0.031 (in L∞ norm). The PGD
search takes 50 iterations with a stepsize 0.002.
PGD-type methods (if the defense is deterministic) or the
EOT method (if the defense is randomized) for crafting ad-
versarial examples. BPDA has circumvented a handful of
recent defense techniques [14, 50, 25, 39, 7] that implement
gradient obfuscation, in many defenses resulting in 0% ro-
bust accuracy. We therefore evaluate our defense against it
and its possible variants.
Differentiable approximation on backward pass. The
update rule (3) in our adversarial transformation involves two
non-differentiable operators, namely, sgn(·) and Πx′∈∆x(·),
whose specific forms are given in Appendix A.3. To launch
BPDA attack, we need to replace them with differentiable
operators and compute their derivatives. We experimented
with two different smooth approximations of sgn(·): the
soft sign function x1+|x| and tanh function
ex−e−x
ex+e−x . The
smooth approximation of Πx′∈∆x(·) is not explicitly defined.
Instead, we directly approximate its derivative using
d
dx
Πx′∈∆x(x) ≈
{
1, if |x| < ∆,
1
(1+|x|)2 , otherwise.
(5)
Reported in Fig. 5, the experiments show that our defense is
robust to this attack, as long as the number of LL-PGD steps
N in g(·) is not too small (i.e., N > 5).
Figure 6. Robustness w.r.t. perturbation size. We test our de-
fense robustness using independently trained defense models with
increasing perturbation range ∆ used in g(·). The standard ac-
curacy (blue curve) is measured using clean images. The robust
accuracies under BPDA-I attack (Sec. 4.1) and WT attack (Sec. 4.2)
are in orange and green, respectively. In our input transformation,
we enable random start of (3). Therefore, in BPDA-I attack, we
use 500 samples of g˜(·) for EOT gradient estimation. The gradient-
descent setup is the same as that in the earlier experiments in Fig. 5.
If the number of LL-PGD steps N is set too small, BPDA
attack is indeed able to find adversarial examples (Fig. 5).
Therefore, another attempt one may ponder is to craft adver-
sarial examples on a model trained with a small N (N ≤ 3),
and use them to transfer attack our defense (which is trained
with a larger N ). This attack remains ineffective (see details
in Appendix A.3). We conjecture that this is because the
adversarial examples for the model with a small N have a
different distribution from that with a larger N [30, 40].
Identity mapping approximation. Another possible at-
tack is by replacing the input transformation g(·) with the
identity mapping for gradient estimation in BPDA backward
pass (recall discussion in Sec. 3.3). We refer this attack as
BPDA-I attack. Under this attack, several previous defenses
(e.g., [33, 39, 14]) have been nullified.
We applied BPDA-I attack on our defense. The attack
setup and results are summarized in Fig. 6. As the pertur-
bation size ∆ in the adversarial transformation increases,
the robust accuracy of our method increases. The robust
accuracy is always upper bounded by the standard accuracy,
which decreases gradually as ∆ increases. If ∆ is too large,
the excessive perturbations to the input make the network fa
harder to learn and thus lower the standard and robust accu-
racies. Empirically, ∆ = 0.2 offers the best performance.
Reparameterization. In Sec. 3.3, we described another
BPDA strategy, one that uses reparameterization to smoothly
approximate our adversarial transformation g(·). As dis-
cussed therein, it is extremely hard to directly derive the
reparameterization function. Instead, we attempted to train
a Fully Convolutional Network [24] to represent h(z). We
denote this network as h(x;θ), whose weights are optimized
with the loss function, `(θ) = Ex∈X ‖h(x;θ)− g(x)‖2 .
Here X represents the distribution of natural images (we use
CIFAR-10 as the training dataset).
Our experiment shows that although we can reach a low
Defense Model Clean Transfer HSJ GA
No defense 92.9% 1.3% 3.6% 5.8%
Madry et al. [26] 81.7% 77.5% 72.1% 78.4%
Ours 82.9% 78.1% 82.0% 81.9%
Table 2. Robustness under black-box attacks. In the transfer
attack, adversarial examples are crafted on an independently trained
ResNet18 model. The query-based attacks are performed using a
third-party library foolbox [32] with default parameters to launch
these attacks. All adversarial examples are restricted in the L∞
ball with a perturbation size of 0.031.
loss value in training h(x;θ), the loss on test dataset always
stays high, indicating that h(x;θ) is always overfitted. As
a result, the adversarial examples resulted in this way have
almost no effect on our defense model—the accuracy drop
under this attack is within 1% from the standard accuracy.
See Appendix A.2 for the details of this experiment.
4.2. Gradient-Free Attacks
Several attacking methods require no gradient informa-
tion of the model, and they can be employed to potentially
threaten our defense. As discussed in Sec. 2, these attacks
fall into two categories: transfer attack and query-based at-
tack. Against both types of attacks we evaluate our defense.
White-box transfer attack. In white-box setting, the ad-
versary has full knowledge of our defense model. A tempt-
ing idea is to generate adversarial examples on the classi-
fier model fa, and use them to transfer attack our defense
model fa(g(·)). Note that this differs from BPDA-I attack
in Sec. 4.1, where fa is used only in the backward pass for
gradient estimation while the forward pass still uses the full
model fa(g(·)). Here, in contrast, adversarial examples are
generated solely on fa. We refer this attack as White-box
Transfer (WT) attack, and report the robust accuracies of our
defense in Fig. 6, along with the results under BPDA-I attack.
We found that our model’s robustness performances under
both attacks are similar, and ∆ = 0.2 is the best choice.
One may realize another attacking possibility by noticing
the way we choose fb (on which we perform adversarial
transformation). In Sec. 3.4, we present that fb should be
chosen such that for a given natural image x the average
transformation Eg˜∼T g˜(x) stays far from x. Thus, it seems
plausible to first generate adversarial examples on fa us-
ing PGD attack starting from the average transformation
Eg˜∼T g˜(x), and use them to attack our full model fa(g(·)).
However, thanks to the large perturbation range ∆x we use
(recall Sec. 3.3), Eg˜∼T g˜(x) is always far from a natural
image (see the image in the red box of Fig. 4). Thus the
adversarial examples generated in this way all have easily
noticeable artifacts; they are not valid.
Black-box attacks. We also evaluate our defense against
the black-box attacks, including the black-box transfer at-
tack [30] and two most recently introduced query-based
Method Astd Arob Best Attack
No defense 92.9% 0.0% PGD
Madry et al. [26] 81.7% 42.7% PGD
Zhang et al. [54] 80.4% 44.6% PGD
Xie et al. [51] 83.8% 45.2% PGD
Guo et al.* [14] - 0.0% BPDA
Buckman et al.* [7] - 0.0% BPDA
Dhillon et al.* [10] - 0.0% BPDA
Song et al.* [39] - 5.0% BPDA
Ours (under BPDA) 82.9% 80.2% BPDA
Ours 82.9% 78.1% Transfer
Table 3. Comparisons on CIFAR-10. Methods indicated by * are
those circumvented in [2]. We evaluate other methods using the
code provided in the original papers, training them using the same
network and hyperparameters as our method. The perturbation
range of all adversarial examples is ∆ = 0.031. The last column
indicates the most efficient attacking method that produces the
worst robustness. The second last row indicates the worst-case
robustness of our method under all BPDA-type attacks, while the
last row indicates our worst-case robustness under all attacks.
attacks, HopSkipJumpAttack (HSJ) [9] and GenAttack
(GA) [1]. In Table 2, we summarize the robust accuracies of
our model under these attacks, along with two baselines from
the same classification model (fa) optimized respectively
using standard training and adversarial training.
5. Comparisons and Further Evaluation
Comparisons. We now compare the robustness of our
method with other state-of-the-art defense methods under
white-box attacks. Unlike many others that can be attacked
using PGD-type methods, our defense model is inherently
non-differentiable, immune to direct PGD attacks. There-
fore it is not possible to compare all these defense methods
under exactly the same attacks. Instead, we compare the
worst-case robustness of our method under all the attacks
described in Sec. 4 with other methods.
The comparison results on CIFAR-10 dataset are sum-
marized in Table 3, where Astd is the standard accuracy
tested with clean images, and Arob is the worst-case robust
accuracy under all tested attacks. The methods indicated
by a star (*) are those circumvented by Athalye et al. [2].
We include their results therein as a reference. The other
defense methods (including ours) all use ResNet18 as their
classification model, trained with SGD (learning rate=0.1,
momentum=0.9) for 80 epochs.
On CIFAR-10 dataset, the most effective attack on our
method is the black-box transfer attack (Sec. 4.2), although
its severity surpasses BPDA attacks only slightly: the worst-
case robust accuracy of our method under BPDA attack and
its variants (Sec. 4.1) is 80.2%. Nevertheless, our robustness
performance is significantly better than the state-of-the-art
methods, as shown in Table 3.
We also performed the comparisons on Tiny ImageNet
Figure 7. Robustness w.r.t. EOT samples. When using EOT to
attack our method, we sample our adversarial transformation with
different random starts x+ δ to estimate the expected∇fa(g(x)).
When ∆ = 0.1 (blue curve), increasing the sample size allows EOT
to better attack our defense, until it plateaus. But when ∆ = 0.2
(orange curve), EOT becomes persistently inefficient.
dataset, and our method demonstrates significantly stronger
robustness as well. In short, our worst-case robust accuracy
is 40.2%, in stark contrast to previous methods, which all
have robust accuracies around 18%. The results are reported
in details in Appendix A.4.
Training cost. Our method has significantly lower training
cost than the adversarial training [26, 54, 51], while offer-
ing stronger robustness. For example, our method takes 82
minutes to train a ResNet18 model on CIFAR-10 for 80
epochs, while the adversarial training takes 460 minutes.
As a baseline, the standard training takes 56 minutes. All
timings are measured on a NVIDIA RTX 2080Ti GPU.
Sufficiency of EOT samples. Our defense is randomized,
and when using EOT to attack our method we take 500 sam-
ples of g˜(·) (recall experiments in Fig. 6). Here we conduct
additional experiments to ensure the sufficiency of using
500 samples for estimating the expectation. As shown in
Fig. 7, when the perturbation size ∆ is small and the number
of samples is also small (e.g., < 100), increasing sample
size indeed allows EOT to better attack our method. How-
ever, when the perturbation size is set to 0.2, the value we
consistently use throughout all our evaluations, EOT attacks
became persistently inefficient, regardless of the sample size.
Therefore, we conclude that 500 samples in EOT allow thor-
ough evaluation of our defense against EOT.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a simple defense mechanism against
adversarial attacks. Our method takes advantage of the nu-
merical recipe that searches for adversarial examples, and
turns this harmful process into a useful input transformation
for better robustness of a network model. On CIFAR-10
and Tiny ImageNet datasets, it demonstrates state-of-the-art
worst-case robustness under a wide range of attacks. We
hope our work can offer other researchers a new perspective
to study the adversarial defense mechanisms. In the future,
we would like to better understand the theoretical properties
of our adversarial transformation and their connections to
stronger adversarial robustness.
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Supplementary Document
One Man’s Trash is Another Man’s Treasure:
Resisting Adversarial Examples by Adversarial Examples
A. Additional Experiments and Setups
A.1. Network Structure of fb
Following the guidelines presented at the end of Sec. 3.4,
we choose to use a VGG-style small network in fb for defin-
ing our adversarial transformation. This network is sim-
ple enough to enable fast adversarial transformation, while
producing the expectation over transformation image (i.e.,
Eg˜∼T g˜(x)) drastically different from the input image. The
structure of fb for experiments on CIFAR-10 dataset is de-
scribed in Table 4.
On Tiny ImageNet dataset, the network structure of fb
remains largely the same except two minor changes to ac-
commodate the different resolution of the images in Tiny
ImageNet. Namely, the changes are at the 12nd layer (which
has a dimension 2048) and the 15th layer (which has a di-
mension 200).
Layer Module Output Size
1 Input 3×32×32
2 Conv(k=3), BN, ReLU 64×32×32
3 MaxPool 64×16×16
4 Conv(k=3), BN, ReLU 128×16×16
5 MaxPool 128×8×8
6 Conv(k=3), BN, ReLU 128×8×8
7 Conv(k=3), BN, ReLU 128×8×8
8 MaxPool 128×4×4
9 Conv(k=3), BN, ReLU 128×4×4
10 Conv(k=3), BN, ReLU 128×4×4
11 MaxPool 128×2×2
12 Flatten 512
13 Linear, ReLU, Dropout 512
14 Linear, ReLU, Dropout 512
15 Linear (output) 10
Table 4. Network structure for fb. Here BN denotes batchnorm
operation, and Conv(k=3) denotes convolutional layer with a kernel
size of 3.
A.2. Reparameterization Attack
As discussed in Sec. 3.3 and 4.1, to launch the reparam-
eterization attack, we need to find a forward function h(·)
that approximate our adversarial transformation process. To
this end, we attempted to train a Fully Convlutional Net-
work (FCN) [24], denoted as h(x;θ), through the following
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Figure 8. Training Loss and validation loss in reparameterization
attack.
optimization,
θ = arg min
θ
Ex∈X ,δ∈∆ ‖h(x+ δ;θ)− g˜δ(x)‖2 , (6)
where X is the given dataset, δ is the initial input perturba-
tion in the L∞ ball of size ∆ (as described in Sec. 3.3), g˜δ(·)
is the deterministic version of our adversarial transformation
g(·): it starts the adversarial search iteration (3) from x+ δ
by using a sampled δ.
However, after optimizing (6), we found that although
the FCN model can reach a relatively low training error, the
error on test set remains high, as depicted in Fig. 8. This
suggests that the FCN model is not able to learn a h(x;θ)
that generalizes well. The inability to generalize is not a
surprise: if h(x;θ) could generalize well, we would have a
direct way of crafting adversarial examples; and PGD-type
iterations would not be needed—which are all unlikely.
Indeed, when we use the trained h(x,θ) to launch a repa-
rameterization attack to our model, the attack hardly suc-
ceeds. Under this attack (on CIFAR-10), the robust accuracy
of our defense is 81.1%, even better than the robust accuracy
under BPDA-I attack (80.2%). In fact, this accuracy nearly
reaches its upper bound, the standard accuracy (i.e., 82.9%),
as reported in Table 3 of the main text.
A.3. BPDA Attack Details and Additional Results
As described in Sec. 4.1, we evaluate our defense model
under the BPDA attack. To launch BPDA attack, we need
to replace the non-differentiable operators in our adversarial
transformation with their smooth approximations. In particu-
lar, the non-differentiable operators in the adversarial update
Robust Acc. (transfer attack)
Defense Model Iterations Standard Acc. N = 1 N = 2 N = 3
N = 3 81.7% 69.7% 66.4% 79.5%
N = 4 82.4% 75.6% 78.7% 79.9%
N = 5 83.1% 81.6% 80.7% 81.7%
N = 10 82.7% 81.4% 81.2% 81.0%
N = 13 82.9% 80.9% 81.1% 81.3%
Table 5. Transfer attack based on BPDA. Each row shows the standard and robust accuracies of our defense model with a different number
of LL-PGD steps in its adversarial transformation g(·). The number of LL-PGD steps in our defense model is shown in the left most column.
The right most three columns correspond to the models with smaller numbers of LL-PGD steps. We use these models to craft adversarial
examples to transfer attack our defense model. It shows that even when the number N of LL-PGD steps in our defense model is moderately
large (N ≥ 5), the transfer attacks become ineffective. In all the evaluations, the perturbation size ∆ in our defense model is set as ∆ = 0.2.
rule (3) (in the main text) are the sgn(·) function,
sgn(x) =

1 if x > 0,
0, if x = 0,
−1 if x < 0.
(7)
and the L∞ projection operator,
Πx′∈∆x(x) =

x if |x| ≤ ∆,
−∆ if x < −∆,
∆ if x > ∆.
(8)
In Sec. 4.1, we experimented with two different smooth
approximations of the sgn(·) function, namely, the soft sign
function x1+|x| and tanh function
ex−e−x
ex+e−x , and the projection
operator is replaced by directly approximating its derivative
using (5).
Also discussed in Sec. 4.1 is an additional transfer attack:
First, we craft adversarial examples by setting the number N
of LL-PGD steps to be a small value. This is motivated by
the observation that, as shown in Fig. 5, BPDA attack is able
to find effective adversarial examples when N is small. We
then use the resulting adversarial examples to transfer attack
our defense model, which uses a larger number of LL-PGD
steps in the adversarial transformation (in both training and
inference). As summarized in Table 5, our experiment shows
that this attack remains ineffective to our defense.
A.4. Evaluation on Tiny ImageNet
We also evaluate our defense model on Tiny ImageNet
dataset consisting of 64px×64px RGB images. These im-
ages fall into 200 classes, each has 500 images for training
and 50 images for testing. Following the evaluations setups
in prior works, the adversarial examples used in the attacks
have a maximum perturbation size (in L∞ norm) of 0.031
for pixel values ranging in [0,1]. We use ResNet18 as our
classification network (in fa) and the network structure of
fb is described in Appendix A.1.
We compare our method with the state-of-the-art
method [27] evaluated on Tiny ImageNet and the methods
Method Astd Rrob Best Attack
No defense 58.2% 0.0% PGD
Madry et al. [26] 42.7% 17.3% PGD
Zhang et al. [54] 40.6% 17.7% PGD
Mao et al. [27] 40.9% 17.5% PGD
Ours (Under BPDA) 48.8% 47.9% BPDA
Ours 48.8% 40.2% Transfer
Table 6. Comparisons on Tiny ImageNet. The layout of this
table is similar to Table 3 in the main text (i.e., the comparisons on
CIFAR-10). The perturbation range of all adversarial examples is
∆ = 0.031. The last column indicates the most efficient attacking
method that produces the worst robustness. The second last row
indicates the worst-case robustness of our method under all BPDA-
type attacks, while the last row indicates our worst-case robustness
under all attacks.
based on adversarial training [26, 54]. For all those methods,
we use the implementation code provided in their original pa-
pers. When comparing with these methods, we use the same
training protocol: the models are optimized use SGD (learn-
ing rate=0.1, momentum=0.9) and trained for 80 epochs.
As shown in Table 6, our method demonstrates signifi-
cantly stronger robustness in comparison to previous meth-
ods. Our worst-case robust accuracy is 40.2%. In contrast,
previous methods have robust accuracies around 18%. Re-
markably, the standard accuracy of our method also outper-
forms previous methods.
A.5. Expectation over Transformation Images
Figure 4 in the main text shows a few examples of
the difference between an input image x and its expec-
tation over transformation, that is, the image of normal-
ized x − Eg˜∼T g˜(x). We now provide more samples of
x − Eg˜∼T g˜(x) images on both CIFAR-10 and Tiny Ima-
geNet (see Fig. 9).
Discussion. In [45], Tsipras et al. presented an interest-
ing finding. They visualized the loss gradient with respect
to input pixels, and found that if the model is adversarially
trained, such a loss gradient is significantly human-aligned—
they align well with perceptually relevant features (e.g., see
Figure 2 in their paper). But if the model is not adversarially
trained, the loss gradient appears like random noise. Here,
we discover that the normalized difference x− Eg˜∼T g˜(x)
is also human-aligned, exhibiting perceptually relevant fea-
tures, as shown in Fig. 10. In contrast to the discovery
in [45], we found that x − Eg˜∼T g˜(x) is always human-
aligned. Even if the model fb is not adversarially trained, the
difference image x− Eg˜∼T g˜(x) still exhibits perceptually
relevant features, as along as they are trained with sufficient
number of epochs (see Fig. 9). If the model fb is adversar-
ially trained, those perceptually relevant features become
more noticeable.
B. Discussion on Computational Performance
Our defense demands lower training cost than the stan-
dard adversarial training. For example, on CIFAR-10 dataset,
our method takes 82 minutes to train a ResNet18 model for
80 epochs. This time cost is close to the standard (non-
adversarial) training, which takes 56 minutes for the same
setting. In contrast, the standard adversarial training takes
460 minutes for the same number of epochs and the same
network structure. Notice that the lower training cost in our
method is obtained without sacrificing its robustness perfor-
mance. In fact, as shown in Table 3 in the main text and
Table 6 here, our defense offers much stronger robustness.
The inference cost of our defense is more expensive than
adversarially trained models, because the input image x dur-
ing the inference also needs to be transformed by g(·). In
our experiments, our defense takes 17 seconds to predict the
labels of 10000 images in CIFAR-10, while the adversarially
trained model and the standard model (without adversarial
training) both take 4 seconds. This is the cost we have to pay
in exchange for stronger robustness. We argue that this is
worthy cost to pay because in comparison to network train-
ing cost, the inference cost is negligible. In fact, almost all
adversarial defense methods that rely on input transforma-
tion [14, 39, 33] have a performance overhead at inference
time. For example, PixelDefend [39] projects the input to
a pre-trained PixelCNN-represented manifold through 100
steps of L-BFGS iterations. Their transformation is about
10× slower than ours even when our method uses the same
network structure in fb as their PixelCNN.
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Figure 9. Here we show supplementary examples similar to those in Fig. 4 in the main text. The top four images are the results on CIFAR-10,
while the bottom four images are those on Tiny ImageNet. The first column shows the input image x in each example. The other columns
show the images generated by adversarial transformations with the fb models that are untrained, trained with an increasing number of epochs,
and adversarially trained, as labeled on the top line. Each of those images is a visualization of the normalized difference x− Eg˜∼T g˜(x),
where the expectation is estimated using 5000 samples. It is evident that as the number of training epochs increases, the expectation over
transformation Eg˜∼T g˜(x) drifts further away from x, and the adversarially trained fb model produces an even larger difference.
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Figure 10. Here we visualize the normalized difference between an input image (shown in column (a)) and its expectation over transformation
image Eg˜∼T g˜(x) in our defence model. The top three examples are from CIFAR-10, and the bottom three are from Tiny ImageNet. Column
(b) shows the results using fb models with standard training, while column (c) are results with adversarial training. The Expectation over
transformation in each example is estimated using an increasing number of samples. The ten sub-images (from left to right, top to bottom) in
each group of column (b) and (c) are results in which the expectations over transformation are estimated using 1, 10, 50, 100, 200, 500,
1000, 2000, 5000, 10000 samples of g˜(·), respectively.
